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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we test three popular versions of the monetary model (flexible price, forward-looking and 
real interest differential models) for the OECD member countries by applying Johansen cointegration 
technique. Based on country-by-country analysis, we conclude that monetary models do not provide the 
expected results. We reveal several shortcomings of the models and examine the building blocks of the 
fundamental version. Although researchers always blame the deviations from purchasing power parity 
as the reason for the failure of the monetary model, our analysis indicates that invalidity of Keynesian 
money demand function is also responsible for unfavourable results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Exchange rate modelling is very crucial not just for economic theory but also for financial practitioners. 
The search for an acceptable model to explain the movements of exchange rates with macroeconomic 
variables has led to an extensive literature on exchange rate modelling (see, e. g. Sarno and Taylor, 2002 
or MacDonald, 2007 for a survey). This theoretical literature does not rest on a fully specified 
macroeconomic framework that captures all the main exchange rate influences and transmission 
mechanism, attention being focused on certain relationships while excluding others. 
 
The popular framework; balance of payments approach, focuses on the flows of currencies arising from 
international transactions for goods, services, portfolio investment and direct investment; whereas the 
asset market approach emphasises outstanding stocks of currencies as well as the current determinants 
of money demands. The asset market approach treats money as an asset; accordingly, exchange rates 
are asset prices. Within the asset market approach, the monetary model, which applies supply and 
demand mechanism to determine the exchange rates, attracts much attention both from the theoretical 
and empirical points of view. 
 
A vast literature on exchange rate modelling has developed to offer empirical evidence on the relevance 
of the monetary model variants. The general conclusion from this literature is mixed and inconclusive: 
the models seemed to work, to some extent, for the first period of the floating experience (i. e., 1975-
1978), but they have not worked so well for the following decades. The results also depend on the 
estimation techniques. Recent studies based on panel data estimations provide more support for the 
models (see, e.g. Cerra and Saxena, 2010 for panel cointegration results), bringing up the discussion on 
the validity of the monetary model again. Consequently, it is considered whether the negative results 
are due to insufficient econometric techniques. Therefore, researchers employ various new methods for 
estimations and compare the findings. 
 
Meese and Rogoff (1983a, b) and Cheung et al. (2005) focus on the explanatory power of the monetary 
models and state that it is extremely poor, not performing better than a naive random-walk model in 
the post sample forecasting tests, even though realised explanatory variables are used during the post 
sample period. Whereas MacDonald and Taylor (1994) assert that an unrestricted version of monetary 
model outperforms the random walk and some other models in an out-of-sample forecasting contest. 
Yet, we can say that unfavourable results outweigh the favourable ones. As Neely and Sarno (2002) put 
it: “…the negative results for monetary models have nonetheless produced a conventional wisdom in the 
profession that exchange rate changes cannot be forecast—or cannot be forecast using macroeconomic 
fundamentals. It is not clear, however, that this is true.” 
 
Although monetary model variants have been tested many times, reasons for the failure of the models 
have not been extensively investigated. Thus, the main objective of this paper is to offer further 
empirical evidence and explanations on the failure of the monetary model. Our work contributes to the 
literature in several ways. We reveal various shortcomings of the model that are not mentioned in the 
previous analyses. We employ a wide range of currency pairs (consist of OECD member countries’ 
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currencies), which comprise major reserve currencies that are commonly used in the empirical literature 
as well as the remaining (non-reserve) currencies that are generally neglected, probably due to the 
limited trade turnover and low level of international demand. Our research covers three popular 
variants of the monetary model together with the building blocks of the fundamental version. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the theoretical framework and provides 
our criticisms. Section 3 describes the data and the econometric methodology adopted in this study. 
Section 4 reports the empirical results, and Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
 
 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
2.1. Flexible Price Monetary Model 
 
The Flexible Price Monetary Model (FPMM) or the Frenkel-Mussa-Bilson1 model rests on two basic 
assumptions. First, all prices are assumed to be perfectly flexible yielding continuous Purchasing Power 
Parity (PPP). Second, it is assumed that money markets are always in equilibrium with respect to 
Keynesian Money Demand Function (KMDF) that defines real money balances as a function of real 
income and interest rate: 
 
M/P = L(Y,i)                                                                                                                                                                  (1) 
 
where M refers to the nominal money supply, P denotes the price level, Y is the real income and i is the 
interest rate. 
 
According to KMDF, the demand for real money balances (M/P) is positively dependent on real income 
and negatively dependent on interest rate. It is acknowledged that a rise in real income induces higher 
level of real money demand to realise greater number of transactions. However, an increase in interest 
rate is expected to decrease the demand for real money balances due to the rise in cost of holding 
money. Consequently, M refers to the narrow definition of money supply, which is highly sensitive to 
interest rate. 
 
Based on Cagan (1956) functional form, KMDF can be expressed with the following equation; 
 
Mt /Pt = Yt
k
 e
-λi
t                                                                                                                                                            (2) 
 
where k and λ represent the income elasticity and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand, 
respectively. 
 
Taking natural logarithm in equation (2), we obtain2: 
                                                          
1
 See Frenkel (1976), Mussa (1976) and Bilson (1978)   
2
 In every following equation, lower-case letters are used to denote the variables in natural logarithm, except interest rate (i), 
which is always in level. 
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mt - pt =  kyt - λit                                                                                                                                                          (3) 
 
and solving equation (3) for p; 
pt = mt - kyt + λit                                                                                                                                                          (4) 
 
For a foreign country the same equation applies: 
pt* = mt* - k*yt* + λ*it*                                                                                                                                             (5) 
where * denotes foreign variables and coefficients. 
 
Intercountry difference renders: 
pt - pt* = mt - mt* - kyt + k*yt* + λit - λ*it*                                                                                                              (6) 
 
Equation (6) states that relative prices are influenced by relative money supplies, real incomes and 
interest rates. 
 
The second building block of FPMM is PPP. The law of one price, which states that identical products 
must sell for the same price, constitutes the foundation of PPP. According to the law of one price, 
arbitrage eliminates the discrepancy in prices. PPP extends the law of one price by incorporating price 
indices to the model and postulates that international trade removes arbitrage opportunities. 
 
In its absolute version, PPP establishes a relationship between the exchange rate S (expressed as the 
domestic currency price of a unit of foreign currency) and the ratio of domestic and foreign prices (P and 
P*, respectively), so that 
 
St =Pt /Pt*                                                                                                                                                                      (7) 
 
or, taking natural logarithms;   
 
st = pt - pt*                                                                                                                                                                     (8) 
 
Its implication is that an increase in the domestic price level or a decrease in the foreign price level 
results in depreciation of the exchange rate to retain purchasing power parity between domestic and 
foreign currencies. 
 
Combining (8) and (6), we obtain FPMM; 
 
st = mt - mt* - kyt + k*yt* + λit - λ*it*                                                                                                                      (9) 
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Assuming that the domestic demand for money has identical elasticities to those of the demand for 
foreign currency (i. e., k=k* and λ=λ*) provides the following restricted model; 
st = (mt - mt*) - k(yt - yt*) + λ(it - it*)                                                                                                                     (10) 
 
Equation (10) implies three testable hypotheses: (i) the coefficient on the relative money supply is 
positive and unity; (ii) the coefficient on the relative real income term is negative, and (iii) the coefficient 
on the relative interest rate is positive. 
 
 
2.2. Forward-Looking Monetary Model 
 
Flexible price monetary model can be modified to incorporate current expectations, denoted as Et , by 
applying uncovered interest rate parity that states;  
 
Et (st+1) - st = it - it*                                                                                                                                                    (11) 
 
Replacing interest rate differential in FPMM with the expected change in exchange rate provides; 
 
st = (mt - mt*) - k(yt - yt*) + λ [Et (st+1) - st ]                                                                                                             (12) 
 
Equation (12) can be rearranged as follows; 
 
st = (1+λ)
-1 xt  + δ [Et (st+1) ]                                                                                                                                       (13) 
 
where  xt = [(mt - mt*) - k(yt - yt*)]     and    δ = λ(1+λ)
-1 
 
Based on rational expectations, the expected exchange rate in period t+1 can be written as:  
 
Et (st+1) = (1+λ)
-1 Et (xt+1) + δ [Et (st+2) ]                                                                                                                    (14) 
 
By replacing the expected exchange rate recursively for all future periods and imposing the 
transversality condition, 
j
lim δ j Et(st+j) = 0, forward-looking monetary model (FLMM) can be defined with 
the equation below. 
 
 
st = (1+λ)
-1

0j
δ j Et(xt+j)                                                                                                                                            (15) 
 
δ can be considered as a discount factor. Accordingly, (15) states that exchange rate is the present value 
of all expected future values of xt (fundamentals); money supply and real income. However, future 
values of the fundamentals are not observable, thus FLMM is not practical to determine the exchange 
rate. Subtracting current value of the fundamentals from both sides of (15) makes the necessary 
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arrangement that enables us to establish the link between exchange rate and fundamentals during the 
same period3. 
 
 
st - xt = 

1j
δ j Et(∆xt+j)                                                                                                                                               (16) 
 
 
If fundamentals are first-difference stationary then the right-hand side of (16) must be stationary. 
Consequently, the exchange rate is expected to be cointegrated with the fundamentals, provided that it 
is also first-difference stationary time series (see Macdonald and Taylor, 1992 for details). Thus, FLMM 
can be tested with the equation and constraints below by utilising a cointegration method, based on the 
assumption that there is no rational bubble; 
 
st = β0 (mt - mt*) + β1 (yt - yt*)                                 (β0 =1, β1 <0)                                                                        (17) 
 
 
 
2.3. Real Interest Differential Model 
 
The Real Interest Differential Model (RIDM) was developed by Dornbusch (1976) and Frankel (1979). The 
model is based on the idea that prices are sticky and PPP holds only in the long-run so that inflation rate 
differentials can differ from interest rate differentials temporarily.  
 
The model allows for short term deviations from PPP. Some well-known reasons for deviations from PPP 
are; transportation costs, tariffs and other legal barriers to commerce, non-tradable products and 
differences in the content of price indices across countries (see, e. g. Sosvilla-Rivero and García, 2006). 
 
RIDM asserts that the initial rise in interest rate induces capital inflow and sharp appreciation of the 
domestic currency in the short-run, followed by a slow depreciation as prices adjust. That is due to rapid 
adjustment of asset prices while goods prices respond gradually, thus yielding the overshooting 
characteristic.  
 
RIDM is based on three building block equations. The first one is uncovered interest rate parity 
expressed in (11). The second one postulates that FPMM determines only the long-run equilibrium 
exchange rate and replaces the interest rate differential in (10) with expected inflation rate differential; 
 
s t = ( m t - m t*) - k ( y t - y t*) + λ ( t - t*)                                                                                                  (18) 
 
where “bar” denotes the long-run equilibrium and   refers to the expected inflation rate. 
 
                                                          
3
 We rewrite x
t
 as; x
t
 = (1+λ)
-1

0j
δ 
j
 x
t 
, and subtract it from the right-hand side of Equation (15) to obtain Equation (16).    
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The third equation states that the exchange rate is expected to change at the rate of expected inflation 
differential when the long-run equilibrium is obtained for s; 
 
Et (st+1) - st = ϴ ( s t - s t ) + ( t - t*)                                                                                                                     (19) 
 
where ϴ is the speed of adjustment, which depends on the degree of price stickiness, towards the 
equilibrium level. 
 
Solving for st by using (11), (18) and (19) provides; 
 
s t = ( m t - m t*) - k ( y t - y t*) - (1 /ϴ) (i t - i t*) + (λ + 1 /ϴ) ( t - t*)                                                             (20) 
 
RIDM is obtained by rewriting (20) as below: 
 
s t = ( m t - m t*) - k ( y t - y t*) - (1 /ϴ) ( r t - rt*) + λ ( t - t*)                                                                         (21) 
 
where r  is the real interest rate 
 
On assuming that short interest rates capture real interest rates (i.e. the liquidity impulses of monetary 
policy) and long bond yields capture expected inflation (MacDonald, 2007), RIDM can be tested based 
on the equation and constraints below (for further details see Frankel, 1979 or MacDonald, 2007, p: 137); 
 
st = α0 ( mt  - mt*) + α1 ( y t - y t*) + α2 (i
S
t  - i
S
t *) + α 3 ( i
L
t  - i
L
t *)                      (α0=1; α1,α2 <0; α3>0)                 (22) 
where i S and i L denote, respectively, short term and long term interest rates 
 
FPMM postulates that real interest rates are always equal to each other across countries due to 
international capital movements seeking excess profit opportunity, whereas RIDM allows for temporary 
differences in real interest rates. Thus, RIDM is not considered as a long-run model, since it incorporates 
short term influences. Nevertheless, it is utilised in some researches to test the monetary model for the 
long-run (see, e.g. Baillie and Selover, 1987; Kearney and MacDonald, 1990; Cheung and Chinn, 1998; 
Ketenci and Uz, 2008; Hunter and Menla Ali, 2014) 
 
 
 
2.4. Possible reasons for the failure of the monetary models 
 
Since its conception in the 1970s, the monetary model has become the dominant theoretical model of 
exchange rate determination. Researchers test FPMM and its variants by employing variety of currency 
parities, econometric techniques and research methodologies. In general, the monetary models perform 
very poorly and empirical findings do not support the expected link between macro fundamentals and 
exchange rates based on country-by-country analysis during the floating exchange rate period, while 
panel data estimates provide mixed but more support for the models (see, e. g. Husted and MacDonald, 
1998; Groen, 2000; Rapach and Wohar, 2004; Ketenci and Uz, 2008; Cerra and Saxena, 2010). 
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Regarding the (absolute) PPP assumption, a building block of the monetary model that relates exchange 
rates to prices, it is almost always rejected (see, e. g. Sosvilla-Rivero and García, 2006). For that reason, 
there is a common belief that the empirical failure of the monetary models is mainly due to deviations 
from PPP. As Smith and Wickens (1984) state: “…empirical tests of the exchange rate equation arising 
from the monetary model very often lead to rejection of the model. The blame for this is usually 
attributed to the breakdown of the purchasing power parity assumption.”  
 
Thus, the extended versions incorporate additional components into FPMM to allow for deviations from 
PPP. RIDM is the case, which attends to short term deviations. Another version, known as Hooper-
Morton model, enriches FPMM further with cumulative trade balance to allow for long term deviations 
from PPP (see Hooper and Morton, 1982 for details), whereas an alternative version adds the relative 
price of “tradables to nontradables” into RIDM, based on the assumption that PPP holds only for 
tradable products in the long-run (see Chinn and Meese, 1995 for an overview of the extended 
monetary models).  
  
Although academia has devoted considerable attention to deviations from PPP; we assert that the 
failure of monetary models is also due to insufficiency of Keynesian money demand function (KMDF) to 
formulate all the motivations for money demand. KMDF neglects intercountry money demand. 
Consequently, failure of the monetary models, especially for the currency parities comprising “reserve 
currencies” that are commonly used in international transactions, is not surprising for us. 
 
We contend that the most of the empirical studies on the monetary models employ currency parities 
that encompass commonly traded currencies such as the US Dollar, the Euro, the Sterling Pound or the 
Japanese Yen. However, these currencies are “reserve currencies4 ”, meaning that they are demanded 
and kept in reserves by many central banks in the world to be able to maintain financial stability and to 
intervene in the FX market when necessary. There is global demand for those currencies, especially for 
the US Dollar and the Euro, since much of the amount of international trade and direct investment 
settled in these currencies. In addition, there are large volumes of both assets and currency swap 
agreements denominated in these currencies.  
 
Nevertheless, the implicit assumption of the monetary models is that currencies are not internationally 
demanded as reserve currencies. The narrow perception, which ignores several reasons to demand 
foreign currencies, is one of the important shortcomings of the models. Currency substitution is the case 
of demanding a reserve currency in parallel to or instead of the domestic currency and a crucial situation 
that violates the mechanism of monetary models. Consider the case that domestic currency is not a 
reserve currency but the foreign currency is. According to the monetary models, nominal exchange rate 
is supposed to appreciate when real income in the home country increases. However, in reality, 
                                                          
4
 Three sets of factors have been identified as critical for producing an international currency: (i) economic weights, (ii) 
openness and depth of financial markets, (iii) and credibility of economic and legal systems (see, e. g., Eichengreen, 2005, and 
Helleiner, 2008). 
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appreciation of the domestic currency may not occur as expected because it is not possible to detach 
the demand for the domestic currency from that for the foreign (reserve) currency. 
 
The shortcomings of monetary models are not limited to the deviations from PPP and to insufficient 
specification of money demand function. Monetary models decompose real money balances (M/P) and 
use money supply and price level individually to incorporate PPP. However, this method imposes a 
restriction for the econometric model that requires one-to-one relationship between price level and 
money supply. Besides, the model postulates that income elasticity and interest semi-elasticity of 
money demand are stable. Yet, it is very likely that they have been changing due to financial crises, 
regulatory changes that occurred in the banking sector and development of financial systems (e. g. using 
credit cards instead of money) (see, e. g. Huynh and Schmidt-Dengler, 2014, and Lucas and Nicolini, 
2015). 
 
We claim that monetary models are fundamentally flawed due to the several reasons explained above 
and some supportive results for the models based on panel data estimations are spurious, since 
varieties in economic structures of countries ( in terms of some criteria such as; international demand for 
the currency, being net oil importer/exporter, having steady current account surplus/deficit) are mainly 
ignored. 
 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology  
 
3.1. Data 
 
The analysis covers the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member 
countries5. Their currencies are used to form several currency pairs, which can be considered as 2 
groups; 
 
1) The pairs that contain a highly traded reserve currency; the US Dollar, the Euro, the British Pound, the 
Japanese Yen, the Australian Dollar, the Canadian Dollar and the Swiss Frank.  
 
2) The pairs that consist of currencies, which are not major global reserve currencies; the Mexican Peso, 
the Swedish Krona, the Norwegian Krone, the Polish Zloty, the Czech Koruna, the South Korean Won, 
the Israeli Shekel, the Hungarian Forint, the Icelandic Krona and the Turkish Lira. 
 
The first group is employed to observe the effects of reserve currencies on the results. As it is explained, 
monetary models are incapable of formulating the demand for reserve currencies. Thus, the monetary 
models are expected to perform poorly especially for the pairs that consist of the US Dollar, which is the 
                                                          
5
 The OECD member countries; Austria, Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain are treated as Euro Area in the research. The analysis covers the remaining 
OECD members individually: Australia, Canada, Chile, Czech Rebuplic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Japan, S. Korea, 
Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the UK and the USA. 
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most dominant reserve currency, and a currency for which international demand is negligible. 
Nevertheless, the situation is much more complicated for the pairs that comprise two reserve 
currencies. 
 
The second group is used for the appropriate test of the models, meaning that, since international 
demand for those currencies are lower; it is more likely that monetary models yield the expected 
results, provided that PPP and KMDF hold. Employing the second group currency pairs enables us to test 
the models in an unbiased way.  
 
For each country except Denmark, which conducts fixed exchange rate policy, data set covers free 
floating period. Managed floating period is mainly excluded from the analysis because theoretical 
foundation of the monetary model depends on the free-market economy; supply and demand 
mechanism is applied to currency markets. Denmark is not dropped from the research to address all the 
OECD member countries and to see whether the results are affected by the exchange rate system. 
 
The data is mainly obtained from OECD and central banks. M1 is chosen as the relevant money supply 
(M) to be in line with the theory explained in the section 2.1. Real income (Y) and price level (P) are 
proxied by industrial production and consumer price indices, while iL and is denote long term and short 
term interest rates, respectively.  
 
M1, industrial production and consumer price indices are seasonally adjusted. They are in natural 
logarithmic form as well as exchange rates, whereas interest rates are in levels. Availability of data and 
inception of free-floating exchange rate system determine the research period for each country pair. 
Besides, structural breaks created by adoption of inflation targeting monetary policy are taken into 
account. Further information about the data set is provided in Appendix-A. 
 
 
 
3.2. Methodology 
 
To carry out the analysis, Johansen cointegration technique (Johansen, 1988; Johansen and Juselius, 
1990) is employed. The method requires using time series, which are stationary in their first-differenced 
form.  
 
A time series is said to be stationary, if its mean, variance and autocovariance (at various lags) remain 
the same no matter at what point we measure them; that is, they are time invariant (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). If a time series has to be differenced d times to become stationary, then it is denoted as 
I(d); integrated order d. Stationarity is examined by unit root tests. Two popular unit-root tests are the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and the Phillips-Perron (PP) tests. 
 
The null hypothesis of ADF test is δ=0 in the following equation, where t denotes trend; 
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∆Y
t
 = β
1
 + β
2
t + δY
t−1
+

m
i 1

i
 ∆Y
t−i 
+ ε
t                                                                                                                    (23) 
 
Accepting the null hypothesis indicates that the series is not stationary. An alternative test is introduced 
by Phillips (1987), Phillips and Perron (1988). Rather than including extra lags of Δyt (as in ADF test) to 
cope with autocorrelation, they suggest allowing for weak dependence and heterogenity in εt by using 
nonparametric statistical methods. 
 
Cointegration techniques are used to identify long-run economic relationships among non-stationary 
variables. A set of I(1) variables is called cointegrated if a linear combination exists, which is I(0). 
Johansen cointegration is the multivariate case. Hwang (2001) summarises this method as follows; 
 
Let Xt be (n × 1) vector I(1) variables and assume this vector has a k th order vector autoregressive (VAR) 
representation with Gaussian errors, εt : 
 
Xt  = A1 Xt-1 + ... +  Ak Xt-k + εt                                                                                                                                    (24) 
 
where each of Ai is (n × n) matrix of parameters. Letting ∆ represent the first-difference operator, (24) 
can be reformulated into a vector error correction form: 
 
∆Xt  = Г1 ∆Xt-1  +  ...  +  Гk ∆Xt-k+1   + ∏ Xt-k  + εt                                                                                                       (25) 
 
where; 
Гi = - (I- A1  - . . . - Ai ) ,      (i = 1, . . . , k-1) 
∏ = - (I- A1  - . . . - Ak ) 
 
Cointegration can be detected by examining the (n × n) ∏ matrix (∏=αβ’), where α represents the speed 
of adjustment to disequilibrium and β is a matrix of long-run coefficients. The likelihood ratio; or Trace, 
test statistic is commonly used to determine the rank (r) of ∏. The test starts with the null hypothesis 
r=0 (no cointegration) against the alternative r  ≤ 1 (at least one cointegrating vector) and subsequent 
further orders of cointegration r=i against the alternative r ≤ i +1; the sequence stops at r=i when the null 
cannot be rejected (Hunter and Menla Ali, 2014). Trace test statistics can be expressed in terms of 
eigenvalues (λi) and sample size (T); 
 
 
λtrace =  -T 

n
ri 1
(1 - λi)                                                                                                     (26) 
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4. Empirical Analysis 
 
To apply Johansen cointegration, first, integration order of variables is examined by Augmented Dickey 
Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron (PP) tests. For some series, unit root test results do not match. For those 
series, we rely on PP test results and conclude that all series are I(1). Johansen cointegration is applied 
to FPMM, FLMM, RIDM, PPP and KMDF. Unit root and Trace test results are presented in Appendix-B 
and Appendix-C, respectively. Significance level for both of the tests is 5%. 
 
Table-1, Table-2 and Table-3 provide cointegration results for the three variants of the monetary model 
with unrestricted coefficients. We prefer not to utilise the models with restricted coefficients since 
probable failure of the models could be attributed to the assumption of identical elasticities for the 
variables across countries, which is applied by restricting the coefficients.  
 
Lag levels for vector error correction models are specified based on Akaike information criterion. The 
numbers in columns headed m, m*, y, y*, iS, iS*, iL, iL* are the coefficient estimates of the variables. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. In every table, country pairs are marked with *** when 
estimation provides the expected results with entirely significant coefficients and * is used when there 
are some insignificant coefficients, although all coefficient signs are in line with the theoretical model. 
Coefficients are considered as significant if they (in absolute value) are at least twice the standard 
errors. 
 
The expected results for each monetary model version are as follows; 
 
FPMM: significantly positive coefficients for m, y*, iL ; significantly negative coefficients for m*, y, iL* 
FLMM: significantly positive coefficients for m, y* ; significantly negative coefficients for m*, y 
RIDM: significantly positive coefficients for m, y*, iS*, iL ; significantly negative coefficients for m*, y, iS, iL* 
 
Although the theory requires unity coefficient for money supply, we do not focus on the magnitude. 
That is because the unity coefficient depends on two conditions; absolute PPP and one-to-one 
relationship between price level and money supply, which is the outcome of decomposing real money 
balances (see equations; 3 and 4). Both of the conditions must hold strictly to obtain unity coefficient for 
money supply. We allow for flexibility in the coefficient of money supply since those conditions are 
extremely binding. 
 
According to the results in the tables, FPMM always fails to establish the expected links between 
macroeconomic variables and exchange rates. FLMM provides favourable results only for Sweden-USA 
and UK-Euro Area. RIDM provides the expected coefficient signs for Euro Area-USA and Mexico-USA. 
However, m is not statistically significant in the case of Euro Area-USA.  
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  TABLE-1 
  Cointegration Results: Flexible Price Monetary Model 
Home-Foreign m m* y y* i L i L* 
Australia-USA 
-2.48 (0.94) -1.44 (1.10) 3.56 (3.64) -2.82 (1.98) -0.23 (0.08) -0.66 (0.11) 
Canada-USA 
-1.02 (0.10) 0.99 (0.14) -0.41 (0.41) 2.41 (0.46) 0.16 (0.03) -0.07 (0.03) 
Chile-USA 
-0.21 (0.08) 0.58 (0.16) -1.02 (0.30) -0.19 (0.30) -0.04 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Czech R.-USA 
-1.91 (0.24) 2.01 (0.24) 2.23 (0.51) -3.74 (0.69) -0.06 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 
Denmark-USA 
-1.10 (0.53) -0.11 (0.85) 5.92 (2.41) -12.8 (2.84) -0.73 (0.19) -0.23 (0.21) 
Euro Area-USA 
-1.57 (0.30) 3.74 (0.56) 13.2 (2.04) -13.7 (2.17) -0.20 (0.08) 0.11 (0.06) 
Hungary-USA 2.69 (1.24) -0.26 (0.85) 4.94 (1.45) -13.3 (2.62) -0.24 (0.05) -0.43 (0.12) 
Iceland-USA 0.41 (0.22) -1.01 (0.88) 0.22 (0.32) -5.65 (2.28) -0.13 (0.03) 0.46 (0.08) 
Israel-USA 
-1.48 (0.21) 1.38 (0.25) 0.22 (0.43) -3.93 (0.64) -0.27 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 
Japan-USA 
-1.84 (1.68) 0.26 (0.64) -0.02 (0.69) 0.35 (1.24) -1.02 (0.16) 0.27 (0.06) 
S.Korea-USA 
-0.03 (0.06) 0.40 (0.05) -0.35 (0.05) -1.42 (0.11) 0.03 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) 
Mexico-USA 
-8.28 (2.09) 11.5 (2.31) 37.1 (11.2) -22.2 (6.45) -0.13 (0.14) 1.45 (0.26) 
New Zealand-USA 
-7.74 (1.26) 2.86 (1.28) 18.8 (3.69) 14.9 (2.96) 0.78 (0.17) -0.02 (0.32) 
Norway-USA 
-0.61 (0.09) 0.48 (0.20) -1.35 (0.50) -1.45 (0.35) 0.09 (0.03) -0.04 (0.03) 
Poland-USA 
-2.27 (0.24) 1.48 (0.15) 4.01 (0.58) -4.83 (0.52) -0.11 (0.02) 0.12 (0.03) 
Sweden-USA 
-2.42 (0.99) 7.82 (1.97) 10.6 (3.26) -18.6 (4.53) 0.72 (0.19) -0.24 (0.21) 
Switzerland-USA 
-1.03 (2.00) 0.80 (2.02) 5.23 (3.19) 13.5 (2.56) 0.18 (0.28) 1.69 (0.29) 
Turkey-USA 0.62 (0.24) 0.22 (0.34) -2.45 (0.44) 0.79 (0.56) 0.03 (0.01) -0.09 (0.02) 
UK-USA 0.15 (0.12) 1.28 (0.25) 5.99 (1.25) -5.43 (0.80) -0.31 (0.04) 0.12 (0.04) 
Japan-Euro Area 
-1.02 (5.19) 5.15 (1.55) 20.4 (3.89) -21.9 (5.96) 1.41 (0.53) 0.92 (0.33) 
UK-Euro Area 
-0.88 (0.87) 5.26 (1.07) 25.1 (3.11) -14.6 (1.67) -0.48 (0.09) 0.42 (0.09) 
Hungary-Czech R. 
-1.09 (0.25) 1.72 (0.27) 5.40 (0.47) -5.44 (0.52) 0.08 (0.01) 0.06 (0.03) 
S.Korea-Czech R. 
-0.33 (0.27) 0.28 (0.15) 1.16 (0.31) -1.09 (0.30) 0.09 (0.03) 0.05 (0.02) 
Mexico-Czech R. 11.6 (2.64) -17.5 (3.79) -40.8 (5.83) 18.7 (2.41) -0.28 (0.11) -0.65 (0.16) 
Norway-Czech R. 
-2.88 (0.99) 5.35 (0.92) 9.97 (1.55) -0.39 (0.86) 0.09 (0.09) 0.13 (0.07) 
Poland-Czech R. 0.66 (0.44) -2.92 (0.63) 5.74 (0.69) -3.99 (0.44) -0.07 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 
Sweden-Czech R. 5.33 (1.05) -0.84 (0.74) 7.78 (0.76) -7.74 (0.76) -0.01 (0.05) 0.15 (0.03) 
Norway-Hungary 
-3.96 (2.63) 2.24 (0.95) -2.14 (1.34) -1.21 (0.83) 0.01 (0.10) -0.16 (0.05) 
Norway-Iceland 0.10 (0.38) 0.37 (0.13) 2.44 (0.93) -0.94 (0.26) 0.05 (0.02) -0.01 (0.01) 
Norway-Israel 0.34 (0.43) -1.30 (0.30) 0.21 (0.21) 0.49 (0.20) 0.19 (0.02) -0.26 (0.04) 
Norway-S.Korea 1.73 (1.75) -5.50 (2.30) -37.2 (4.28) -10.6 (3.30) -1.02 (0.35) 1.09 (0.34) 
Norway-Mexico 
-1.10 (0.15) 0.83 (0.17) 1.10 (0.37) 1.24 (0.43) 0.15 (0.02) 0.01 (0.01) 
Norway-Poland 
-1.96 (0.55) 1.95 (0.35) 5.74 (0.71) 1.02 (0.63) 0.05 (0.04) 0.04 (0.03) 
Norway-Turkey 1.62 (0.36) -0.49 (0.15) 1.73 (0.57) -0.42 (0.26) 0.04 (0.03) -0.03 (0.01) 
Sweden-Hungary 
-0.41 (0.29) 1.13 (0.21) 2.93 (0.35) -3.84 (0.37) 0.07 (0.02) -0.03 (0.01) 
Sweden-Iceland No Cointegration 
Sweden-S.Korea 0.61 (0.29) -0.07 (0.23) 0.59 (0.32) -1.66 (0.29) -0.01 (0.03) -0.08 (0.04) 
Sweden-Mexico 2.46 (0.59) -3.66 (0.55) -5.44 (0.65) 12.9 (1.60) -0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.02) 
Sweden-Poland 17.5 (3.57) -3.41 (1.63) 9.27 (1.55) -13.1 (2.25) -0.27 (0.10) 0.41 (0.09) 
Sweden-Turkey 
-9.07 (2.96) 4.86 (1.81) 9.11 (3.64) -4.31 (3.79) 0.65 (0.18) -0.15 (0.04) 
  Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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TABLE-2 
Cointegration Results: Forward-Looking Monetary Model 
Home-Foreign m m* y y* 
Australia-USA No Cointegration 
Canada-USA  1.45 (0.31) -2.12 (0.44) 3.84 (1.22) -3.01 (1.17) 
Chile-USA  -0.62 (0.24) -0.05 (0.31) 0.97 (0.93) 1.44 (1.09) 
Czech R.-USA -1.86 (0.26) 2.01 (0.26) 1.99 (0.54) -2.87 (0.63) 
Denmark-USA -1.97 (2.73) -7.25 (3.91) -71.9 (12.0) 54.1 (11.5) 
Euro Area-USA -6.49 (2.02) 20.1 (4.12) 69.6 (16.0) -73.1 (15.0) 
Hungary-USA -0.69 (0.50) 1.78 (0.26) 2.90 (0.79) -5.66 (1.31) 
Iceland-USA -0.09 (0.07) -1.52 (0.30) 1.08 (0.13) -4.26 (0.87) 
Israel-USA -0.82 (0.13) 0.78 (0.15) 0.79 (0.30) -1.76 (0.40) 
Japan-USA -0.04 (1.08) -0.03 (0.35) -0.77 (0.63) 1.64 (0.99) 
S. Korea-USA -9.58 (21.1) -101 (21.3) 41.7 (31.9) 313 (68.3) 
Mexico-USA -0.23 (0.22) 0.53 (0.25) -0.26 (1.71) -0.20 (1.12) 
New Zealand-USA -0.85 (0.20) -0.68 (0.20) 1.75 (0.80) 1.91 (0.46) 
Norway-USA 4.82 (1.09) 4.21 (1.92) 44.5 (7.91) 6.54 (3.75) 
Poland-USA -1.51 (0.26) 1.06 (0.11) 2.36 (0.59) -2.28 (0.42) 
Sweden-USA *** 9.17 (4.07) -24.5 (5.69) -37.7 (11.8) 68.9 (15.7) 
Switzerland-USA -0.74 (0.21) -0.39 (0.22) -0.03 (0.45) 1.91 (0.31) 
Turkey-USA -0.002 (0.19) 1.06 (0.24) -2.33 (0.41) 2.05 (0.42) 
UK-USA 0.08 (0.28) 1.09 (0.64) 8.53 (2.88) -2.08 (1.57) 
Japan-Euro Area -27.7 (6.59) 11.7 (2.37) 34.5 (5.81) -29.9 (8.19) 
UK-Euro Area *** 13.1 (2.94) -22.9 (3.58) -51.3 (8.47) 33.2 (5.70) 
Hungary-Czech R. 0.33 (0.24) 0.09 (0.17) -3.91 (0.42) 4.27 (0.47) 
S.Korea-Czech R. -1.59 (0.24) 0.54 (0.22) 1.33 (0.42) -1.06 (0.37) 
Mexico-Czech R. -5.34 (2.26) 4.35 (2.98) 23.2 (4.10) -10.6 (1.85) 
Norway-Czech R. 1.57 (0.30) -1.48 (0.25) -2.53 (0.48) -0.58 (0.29) 
Poland-Czech R. 0.27 (0.19) -1.71 (0.32) 4.25 (0.49) -3.06 (0.31) 
Sweden-Czech R. -63.5 (16.9) 10.0 (11.4) -111 (12.1) 109 (11.8) 
Norway-Hungary -5.20 (1.00) 1.99 (0.48) -2.68 (0.63) 0.24 (0.40) 
Norway-Iceland 8.55 (3.69) 0.63 (1.35) 61.0 (8.59) -5.36 (2.52) 
Norway-Israel -83.5 (13.3) 20.5 (3.94) 50.0 (7.61) 4.85 (7.28) 
Norway-S.Korea 1.12 (0.91) -3.43 (0.94) -16.3 (2.16) -3.86 (1.69) 
Norway-Mexico -1.95 (0.89) 3.78 (0.89) 14.2 (2.50) -1.42 (2.79) 
Norway-Poland -2.23 (0.59) 2.15 (0.42) 6.92 (0.86) 0.96 (0.74) 
Norway-Turkey 2.70 (0.47) -0.56 (0.17) 0.62 (0.79) -0.75 (0.37) 
Sweden-Hungary -1.86 (0.41) -2.22 (0.45) -6.94 (0.78) 7.04 (0.81) 
Sweden-Iceland -1.93 (1.94) -1.25 (0.42) 17.9 (3.07) -0.47 (0.65) 
Sweden-S.Korea 0.50 (0.26) 0.57 (0.16) 0.82 (0.24) -1.64 (0.27) 
Sweden-Mexico No Cointegration 
Sweden-Poland -11.6 (2.15) 5.61 (1.01) -2.01 (1.02) 2.19 (1.66) 
Sweden-Turkey 1.17 (0.49) 0.26 (0.26) 2.93 (0.59) -3.61 (0.64) 
 
Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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TABLE-3 
Cointegration Results: Real Interest Differential Model     
Home-Foreign m m* y y* i S i S* i L i L* 
Australia-USA -1.74 (0.25) -2.23 (0.29) 5.43 (0.96) 2.77 (0.56) -0.24 (0.02) 0.07 (0.02) 0.40 (0.04) -0.42 (0.04) 
Canada-USA -0.94 (0.11) 0.86 (0.14) -0.70 (0.38) 2.64 (0.44) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 0.19 (0.04) -0.05 (0.04) 
Chile-USA  -0.32 (0.07) 0.29 (0.15) 0.40 (0.36) 1.26 (0.33) -0.05 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.06 (0.02) -0.02 (0.02) 
Czech R.-USA -1.48 (0.26) 1.34 (0.34) 1.14 (0.54) -1.59 (0.85) -0.15 (0.03) 0.03 (0.01) 0.06 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) 
Denmark-USA -0.72 (0.17) 0.73 (0.26) 2.96 (0.65) -3.67 (0.77) 0.01 (0.01) -0.07 (0.03) -0.53 (0.05) 0.56 (0.07) 
Euro Area-USA      * 0.20 (0.32) -2.61 (0.72) -7.06 (1.98) 8.90 (2.42) -0.46 (0.06) 0.15 (0.04) 0.48 (0.10) -0.23 (0.07) 
Hungary-USA 0.66 (0.40) -2.05 (0.36) -5.36 (0.56) 11.65 (1.29) 0.10 (0.02) -0.60 (0.09) 0.02 (0.02) 0.005 (0.03) 
Iceland-USA 4.53 (1.02) -28.6 (4.46) -0.11 (1.41) -35.9 (12.6) -0.12 (0.09) 0.40 (0.17) 0.14 (0.13) -0.77 (0.32) 
Israel-USA -1.58 (0.25) 1.68 (0.25) 0.51 (0.41) -5.08 (0.67) 0.06 (0.02) -0.01 (0.03) -0.33 (0.06) 0.05 (0.03) 
Japan-USA -6.02 (4.11) 3.92 (1.60) 0.50 (1.13) -2.44 (2.27) -1.79 (0.26) 0.15 (0.07) 0.48 (0.27) 0.25 (0.12) 
S. Korea-USA -0.24 (0.07) 0.44 (0.05) -0.25 (0.04) -1.11 (0.17) -0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 0.04 (0.01) -0.01 (0.01) 
Mexico-USA    *** 2.09 (0.30) -2.50 (0.37) -9.70 (1.60) 5.21 (0.96) -0.16 (0.04) 0.07 (0.02) 0.12 (0.04) -0.31 (0.05) 
New Zealand-USA 10.4 (1.59) -2.39 (1.63) -41.8 (5.86) -5.68 (4.30) 0.37 (0.15) -0.93 (0.21) -1.31 (0.28) 1.43 (0.44) 
Norway-USA -0.57 (0.06) 0.69 (0.13) -0.21 (0.30) -1.65 (0.30) -0.03 (0.01) 0.05 (0.01) 0.11 (0.04) -0.07 (0.04) 
Poland-USA -0.09 (0.31) -0.37 (0.24) -2.23 (0.77) 1.83 (0.77) -0.29 (0.03) 0.04 (0.02) 0.20 (0.05) -0.45 (0.05) 
Sweden-USA -1.39 (0.85) 5.45 (1.73) 6.95 (2.83) -12.6 (4.22) -0.67 (0.13) 0.84 (0.13) 2.49 (0.33) -2.42 (0.32) 
Switzerland-USA 16.4 (6.77) -9.25 (6.38) -15.9 (11.2) -61.8 (9.48) -2.71 (0.75) 1.33 (0.67) 3.98 (1.53) -6.21 (1.14) 
Turkey-USA 1.12 (0.16) -0.19 (0.22) -1.32 (0.22) -0.95 (0.31) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) -0.03 (0.01) -0.05 (0.01) 
UK-USA -0.39 (0.05) -0.11 (0.11) -0.74 (0.48) 0.94 (0.36) -0.09 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) -0.01 (0.02) 0.06 (0.02) 
Japan-Euro Area 2.31 (0.63) -0.34 (0.29) 1.49 (0.34) -7.44 (0.73) 0.15 (0.15) 0.26 (0.04) -0.16 (0.05) 0.003 (0.03) 
UK-Euro Area -0.08 (0.96) -3.67 (1.19) -27.4 (3.33) 16.7 (2.05) 0.05 (0.07) -0.14 (0.09) 0.72 (0.10) -0.52 (0.11) 
Hungary-Czech R. -0.97 (0.17) 1.87 (0.28) -2.34 (0.54) 0.80 (0.55) -0.09 (0.01) 0.22 (0.03) 0.09 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) 
S.Korea-Czech R. 0.80 (0.33) -0.45 (0.20) 2.20 (0.30) -1.64 (0.35) -0.01 (0.03) 0.14 (0.04) 0.10 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 
Mexico-Czech R. 5.23 (0.56) -7.47 (0.85) -9.96 (1.47) 4.52 (0.57) 0.37 (0.04) -0.53 (0.05) -0.08 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 
Norway-Czech R. 2.31 (0.59) -3.01 (0.55) -1.82 (0.93) 2.80 (0.63) -0.08 (0.04) -0.24 (0.08) 0.11 (0.06) 0.03 (0.05) 
Poland-Czech R. -1.32 (0.28) 1.27 (0.41) 1.15 (0.44) 0.66 (0.32) -0.002 (0.01) -0.08 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 0.16 (0.03) 
Sweden-Czech R. 4.95 (0.61) -2.01 (0.43) 4.18 (0.52) -3.74 (0.49) -0.03 (0.02) 0.003 (0.03) -0.05 (0.03) 0.12 (0.02) 
Norway-Hungary 2.57 (0.97) -1.68 (0.32) -0.60 (0.35) 1.50 (0.83) 0.07 (0.05) -0.07 (0.03) 0.17 (0.02) 0.05 (0.02) 
Norway-Iceland -0.13 (0.54) 0.24 (0.21) 4.69 (0.88) -1.69 (0.29) -0.07 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) -0.18 (0.06) -0.21 (0.03) 
Norway-Israel -1.29 (0.75) 0.58 (0.52) 2.25 (0.39) 2.34 (0.42) -0.08 (0.05) 0.38 (0.10) 0.41 (0.06) -0.43 (0.13) 
Norway-S.Korea -0.14 (0.26) 0.22 (0.35) -6.23 (0.69) -1.75 (0.52) -0.08 (0.02) 0.26 (0.04) -0.11 (0.05) 0.25 (0.04) 
Norway-Mexico -1.06 (0.20) 0.97 (0.22) 1.74 (0.45) -0.70 (0.63) 0.08 (0.01) -0.09 (0.03) -0.02 (0.04) 0.11 (0.04) 
Norway-Poland -0.96 (0.23) 1.08 (0.16) 1.84 (0.29) -0.22 (0.33) 0.04 (0.01) 0.0002 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 
Norway-Turkey 1.73 (1.39) 1.07 (0.55) 0.28 (1.63) -5.31 (1.34) 0.35 (0.06) 0.24 (0.05) -0.12 (0.09) -0.27 (0.06) 
Sweden-Hungary -2.17 (1.03) 4.40 (0.60) 7.52 (0.97) -10.6 (1.01) -0.01 (0.06) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.05) -0.12 (0.03) 
Sweden-Iceland -13.9 (6.91) 8.73 (1.71) -44.9 (10.2) -5.37 (2.19) -2.45 (0.35) 1.27 (0.15) 1.34 (0.49) -1.74 (0.25) 
Sweden-S.Korea 2.93 (0.64) -1.29 (0.41) 1.83 (0.76) -4.57 (0.60) 0.13 (0.09) -0.30 (0.09) -0.22 (0.06) -0.08 (0.07) 
Sweden-Mexico 0.05 (0.92) -0.75 (0.84) -4.83 (1.04) 2.84 (2.57) 0.06 (0.03) 0.35 (0.05) 0.11 (0.07) -0.37 (0.06) 
Sweden-Poland -12.4 (4.89) 4.42 (2.23) 11.6 (2.32) 10.8 (3.36) -1.07 (0.20) 0.22 (0.13) 0.52 (0.21) 0.16 (0.17) 
Sweden-Turkey 0.52 (0.46) -0.29 (0.28) 2.82 (0.67) -1.06 (0.65) -0.09 (0.04) -0.14 (0.02) 0.001 (0.03) 0.14 (0.02) 
 
  Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
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According to the results based on 40 pairs, only a few of them support the monetary model. However 
we should keep in mind that the most suitable monetary model version for a long-run analysis is FPMM, 
which fails to provide the theoretical relationships in every estimation. Thus, even the very weak 
support for the monetary model based on FLMM and RIDM is questionable, since derivation of RIDM 
reflects short term adjustment mechanism that makes the model inappropriate for a long-run analysis; 
while FLMM requires the conditions, rational expectations as well as absence of rational bubbles, which 
may be violated. 
 
To reveal the reason for the failure of the monetary models, building blocks of the fundamental version 
(FPMM); PPP and KMDF are tested individually. According to (absolute) PPP expressed in (8), price level 
coefficients of the home and foreign countries have to be 1 and -1, respectively. However, it is sufficient 
to have the expected coefficient signs, irrespective of the magnitude, to accept that PPP holds due to 
the reasons effective on the magnitude such as; transportation cost, variety in the content of the price 
indices and differences in weights of the products forming the price indices.  
 
PPP and KMDF are tested by employing the equations below that bring about FPMM; 
 
s = γ1 p + γ2 p*                                                                                                                                   (27) 
 
p = γ3 m + γ4 y + γ5 i
L                                                                                                                                 (28) 
 
PPP is accepted if γ1 and γ2 are significantly positive and negative, respectively, regardless of their 
magnitudes. The validity of KMDF is supported if γ3 and γ5 are significantly positive, while γ4 is 
significantly negative. Although KMDF employs real money balances (M/P), monetary model utilises 
money supply and price level individually. Thus, KMDF is tested in its decomposed version since we are 
interested in testing the building block of FPMM. 
 
Long term interest rate is chosen as the relevant interest rate to be consistent with the monetary 
models, because FPMM is based on the idea that interest rate reflects expected inflation and that is 
assumed to be acceptable for the long term interest rate but not for the short term interest rate. 
Besides, it is not suitable to use short term interest rate, since RIDM incorporates it to the model as the 
remedy for short term deviations from PPP.  
 
Table-4 provides Johansen cointegration results for PPP and decomposed version of KMDF. The 
numbers in columns headed m, y, iL, p, p* correspond to the coefficient estimates of the variables. 
Standard errors are given in parentheses. The tables reveal that one of the main problems about 
monetary model is the invalidity of KMDF. PPP is supported for some of the country pairs, whereas 
KMDF holds only for Mexico. Thus, it is clear that the failure of the monetary model is not just due to 
deviations from PPP but it is also related with insufficient specification of money demand function. 
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TABLE-4 
Cointegration Test Results: 
 
 
 Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
Purchasing Power Parity 
 
(Decomposed) Keynesian Money Demand Function 
Home-Foreign p p* 
 Country m y i L 
Australia-USA -9.29 (2.31) 9.25 (2.62)  Australia 0.24 (0.11) 1.01  (0.35) 0.06 (0.01) 
Canada-USA  -1.76 (3.65) -0.98 (3.71)  Canada 0.34 (0.02) 0.74 (0.09) 0.05  (0.01) 
Chile-USA No Cointegration  Chile 0.10 (0.04) 1.57 (0.26) 0.06 (0.02) 
Czech R.-USA No Cointegration  Czech R. 0.29 (0.01) -0.20 (0.04) -0.004 (0.003) 
Denmark-USA No Cointegration  Denmark No Cointegration 
Euro Area-USA No Cointegration  Euro Area 0.21 (0.01) -0.26 (0.05) -0.03 (0.01) 
Hungary-USA 0.69 (0.70) 1.02 (1.53)  Hungary 1.94 (0.79) -2.97 (1.17) -0.46 (0.08) 
Iceland-USA *** 5.28 (0.83) -10.4 (1.31)  Iceland 0.06 (0.01) 0.37 (0.04) -0.01 (0.003) 
Israel-USA No Cointegration  Israel No Cointegration 
Japan-USA -42.1 (5.59) 2.89 (2.39)  Japan -0.22 (0.03) -0.02 (0.02) -0.04 (0.01) 
S. Korea-USA *** 7.44 (1.27) -9.58 (1.55)  S. Korea 0.01 (0.08) 0.51 (0.06) 0.01 (0.01) 
Mexico-USA *** 4.17 (0.55) -5.70 (1.12)  Mexico *** 0.53 (0.03) -0.57 (0.13) 0.02 (0.004) 
New Zealand-USA No Cointegration  New Zealand 0.35 (0.11) -2.17 (0.53) -0.13 (0.02) 
Norway-USA -0.01 (1.21) -0.89 (0.94)  Norway 0.06 (0.02) -0.64 (0.07) -0.001 (0.004) 
Poland-USA No Cointegration  Poland 0.38 (0.31) -1.02 (0.76) -0.22 (0.04) 
Sweden-USA No Cointegration  Sweden 0.15 (0.01) -0.04 (0.04) -0.01 (0.004) 
Switzerland-USA No Cointegration  Switzerland 0.48 (0.14) 0.29 (0.26) 0.21 (0.03) 
Turkey-USA No Cointegration  Turkey 0.33 (0.04) 0.40 (0.13) -0.01 (0.004) 
UK-USA No Cointegration  UK -1.46 (0.32) 1.95 (1.47) -0.48 (0.10) 
Japan-Euro Area -50.1 (14.9) -6.48 (1.68)  USA 0.29 (0.08) 1.05 (0.18) 0.05 (0.01) 
UK-Euro Area  *** 2.29 (1.07) -2.77 (1.42)      
Hungary-Czech R. 0.24 (0.45) 1.31 (0.94)      
S.Korea-Czech R. No Cointegration      
Mexico-Czech R. No Cointegration      
Norway-Czech R. -443 (96.6) 337 (70.4)      
Poland-Czech R. *** 2.34 (0.48) -1.71 (0.55)      
Sweden-Czech R. No Cointegration      
Norway-Hungary   * 1.02 (1.03) -1.86 (0.43)      
Norway-Iceland *** 18.2 (3.88) -6.34 (1.38)      
Norway-Israel  *** 8.08 (0.82) -5.13 (0.86)      
Norway-S.Korea No Cointegration      
Norway-Mexico    * 0.54 (2.24) -1.03 (1.00)      
Norway-Poland No Cointegration      
Norway-Turkey No Cointegration      
Sweden-Hungary -1.46 (0.72) -1.20 (0.21)      
Sweden-Iceland No Cointegration      
Sweden-S.Korea  *** 9.35 (3.00) -5.47 (1.50)      
Sweden-Mexico  *** 17.2 (4.04) -7.79 (1.31)      
Sweden-Poland  *** 8.91 (2.10) -5.00 (1.04)      
Sweden-Turkey No Cointegration      
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
Modelling exchange rates has been an active area of research during the past three decades. In this 
research, popular variants of the monetary model of exchange rate determination; flexible price 
monetary model (FPMM), forward-looking monetary model (FLMM) and real interest differential model 
(RIDM) are tested for OECD member countries by utilising Johansen cointegration technique. Test 
results show that the models generally fail to establish the expected link between macroeconomic 
variables and exchange rates. 
 
Researchers presume that the failure of the monetary model is mainly due to deviations from PPP. Thus, 
they come up with the extended versions that allow temporary or permanent deviations from PPP. 
However, test results reveal that (decomposed) Keynesian money demand function, one of the building 
blocks of the monetary model, is generally rejected as well. Thus, we suggest that to form an exchange 
rate determination model based on macro fundamentals, first, a valid money demand function must be 
formulated. 
 
However, we expect that the monetary model will still be insufficient to determine the exchange rates 
of reserve currencies since expressing all supply and demand influences for reserve currencies with a 
few macroeconomic variables is not realistic. Besides, adding several components to the model may not 
be a good remedy since the power of econometric tests will decrease. We believe that there is a link 
between macroeconomic variables and exchange rates but the framework of the monetary model is not 
suitable to reveal it.  
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Appendix - A 
 
Data Description 
Monthly variables are used for all countries except Switzerland, Australia and New Zealand since some 
of the variables are available on a quarterly basis for those countries. Thus, quarterly averages of 
monthly variables are calculated to form the country pairs; Switzerland-USA, Australia-USA and New 
Zealand-USA. All the other country pairs are based on monthly data. 
 
Industrial production and consumer price indices are obtained from OECD database for all countries. 
Base year is 2010 for both of the indices. 
 
Exchange rates for the British Pound-Euro and the Japanese Yen-Euro are obtained from the European 
Central Bank, while central bank of Mexico provides the exchange rate for the Norwegian Krone-
Mexican Peso. Central banks of Sweden, Norway and Czech Republic are the sources for the remaining 
exchange rates of Group-2 currency pairs. All the other exchange rates against the US Dollar (Group-1 
currency pairs) are obtained from the web page of OECD.  
 
M1 is used as the relevant money supply. IMF is the source for Canada and Denmark. Statistics Norway 
provides the data for Norway. All the other M1 data are obtained from each country’s central bank. 
 
Data for the short term and long term interest rates are mainly obtained from OECD except;  
Hungary: 3 month treasury bill and 10 year government bond rates are, respectively, the short and long 
term interest rates (Source: Central bank of Hungary). 
Mexico: 3 year government bond rate is the long term interest rate (Source: Central bank of Mexico). 
Turkey: Average deposit rates up to 3 months and 1 year are, respectively, the short and long term 
interest rates (Source: Central bank of Turkey). 
USA: 3 month treasury bill rate is the short term interest rate (Source: St Louis FED). 
 
Research periods for all the models are presented below. M and Q refer, respectively, to month and 
quarter. In every country pair, first-named ones are the home countries and KMDF pertains to them. 
USA is the foreign country in the first 19 pairs below. 
 
Australia-USA: All the models (Q1-1984/Q1-2014) 
Canada-USA: PPP (M7-1970/M5-2014); all the other models (M7-1970/M4-2014) 
Chile-USA: PPP, FLMM (M10-1999/M5-2014); FPMM, RIDM, KMDF (M7-2004 /M5-2014) 
Czech Republic-USA: PPP (M1-2003/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2003/M4-2014) 
Denmark-USA: PPP (M1-1991/M5-2014);  all the other models (M1-1991/M4-2014) 
Euro Area-USA6: PPP (M1-2002/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2002/M4-2014) 
Hungary-USA: PPP (M3-2008/M5-2014); all the other models (M3-2008/M4-2014) 
                                                          
6
 Physical euro coins and banknotes entered into circulation in January 2002. Thus, the analyses for Euro Area-USD and UK-Euro 
Area start from M1-2002, even though data is available for previous years. 
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Iceland-USA: All the models (M4-2001/M8-2008) 
Israel-USA: PPP (M7-2005/M5-2014); all the other models (M7-2005/M4-2014) 
Japan-USA: PPP (M3-1973/M5-2014); all the other models (M4-2003/M4-2014) 
S.Korea-USA: PPP (M1-1998/M6-2014); FPMM, RIDM, KMDF (M10-2000/M5-2014); FLMM (M1-1998/M5-2014) 
Mexico-USA: PPP (M1-1995/M5-2014); FPMM, RIDM, KMDF (M10-2001/M4-2014); FLMM (M1-1995/M4-2014) 
New Zealand-USA: All the models (Q2-1988/Q1-2014) 
Norway-USA: PPP (M4-2001/M5-2014); all the other models (M4-2001/M4-2014) 
Poland-USA: All the models (M1-2004/M5-2014) 
Sweden-USA: PPP (M1-1998/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-1998/M4-2014) 
Switzerland-USA: PPP (Q1-1985/Q1-2014); all the other models (Q1-1985/Q4-2013) 
Turkey-USA: PPP (M1-2006/M6-2014); all the other models (M1-2006/M5-2014) 
United Kingdom-USA: PPP (M10-1992/M5-2014); all the other models (M10-1992/M4-2014) 
USA: KMDF (M7-1970/M5-2014) 
 
Japan-Euro Area: PPP (M4-2003/M5-2014); all the other models (M4-2003/M4-2014) 
United Kingdom-Euro Area: PPP (M1-2002/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2002/M4-2014) 
Hungary-Czech R.: PPP (M3-2008/M5-2014); all the other models (M3-2008/M4-2014) 
S.Korea-Czech R.: PPP (M1-2004/M7-2014); all the other models (M1-2004/M4-2014) 
Mexico-Czech R.: PPP (M1-2008/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2008/M4-2014) 
Norway-Czech R.: PPP (M1-2003/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2003/M4-2014) 
Poland-Czech R.: PPP (M1-2004/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2004/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Czech R.: PPP (M1-2003/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2003/M4-2014) 
Norway-Hungary: PPP (M3-2008/M5-2014); all the other models (M3-2008/M4-2014) 
Norway-Iceland: All the models (M4-2001/M8-2008) 
Norway-Israel: PPP (M1-2011/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2011/M4-2014) 
Norway-S.Korea: PPP (M4-2001/M5-2014); all the other models (M4-2001/M4-2014) 
Norway-Mexico: PPP (M1-2002/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2002/M4-2014) 
Norway-Poland: PPP (M1-2004/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2004/M4-2014) 
Norway-Turkey: PPP (M1-2006/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2006/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Hungary: PPP (M3-2008/M5-2014); all the other models (M3-2008/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Iceland: All the models (M4-2001/M8-2008) 
Sweden-S.Korea: PPP (M9-2005/M5-2014); all the other models (M9-2005/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Mexico: PPP (M1-1998/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-1998/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Poland: PPP (M1-2004/M5-2014); all the other models (M1-2004/M4-2014) 
Sweden-Turkey: PPP (M1-2006/M5-2014); all the other models (M9-2005/M4-2014) 
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Appendix - B 
Unit Root Test Results 
 
The null hypothesis is : there is unit root.  +  and  -  refer, respectively, to acceptance and rejection of the null 
hypothesis at 5% significance level.  c denotes constant, c&T is constant and trend, n indicates using none of 
them in the unit root tests. For each variable, only the results of the longest time series are presented. 
 
  
 LEVEL FIRST DIFFERENCE 
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Philips Perron Augmented Dickey Fuller Philips Perron 
 AIC SIC  AIC SIC  
 n c c 
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T 
n c c 
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T 
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T 
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& 
T 
n c c 
& 
T 
Australia     
 
             
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + - + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 - + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + - - + - - + - + + + - + - - - - - 
                   
Canada                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + - + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + - + + - + + - + - - - + - - - - - 
Chile                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Czech R.                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + - + + + + + - - + - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Denmark                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 - + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
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Euro Area                   
(USD)  s + - + + - + + - + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + - + + - + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + - + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
Hungary                   
(USD)  s - + - + - - + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - + - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + - + + + + + + - + - - - - - 
Iceland                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Israel                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + - + + - - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 - + + + + + + + + - - + - - - - - - 
i
L
 - + - + + - + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Japan                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - - 
p + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - - 
S. Korea                   
(USD)  s + + + + - + + - + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + - + + + + - - - - - - - - 
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Mexico     
 
             
(USD)  s + + - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - - 
m + - - + - - + - + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 - + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - 
p + + - + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - 
New Zealand     
 
             
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 - + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 - + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway                   
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - + - - + - - - 
y + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + - + + - + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Poland     
 
             
(USD)  s + - - + - + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden     
 
             
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + - + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Switzerland     
 
             
(USD)  s + + + - + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + - + + + + + - + + + + - - - - - - 
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UK     
 
             
(USD)  s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
m + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - 
USA     
 
             
m + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
y + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
S
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
i
L
 + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
p + - + + - + + - + - - - - - - - - - 
                   
Japan-Euro Area       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
UK-Euro Area            s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Hungary-Czech R.     s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
S.Korea-Czech R.      s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Mexico-Czech R.       s + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Czech R.      s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Poland-Czech R.       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Czech R.     s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Hungary      s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Iceland        s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Israel           s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-S.Korea       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Mexico        s + - - + - - + - - - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Poland        s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Norway-Turkey        s + + - + + - - + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Hungary     s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Iceland       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-S.Korea       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Mexico       s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Poland        s + + + + + + + + + - - - - - - - - - 
Sweden-Turkey        s + + + + + + - + + - - - - - - - - - 
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Appendix – C 
Trace Test Results: Flexible Price Monetary Model 
 
 
Home-Foreign r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 r ≤ 4 r ≤ 5 r ≤ 6 
Australia-USA 143.4 (0.00) 94.2 (0.06) 58.7 (0.27) 32.9 (0.56) 16.2 (0.69) 6.0 (0.69) 0.0 (0.86) 
Canada-USA  240.7 (0.00) 139.1 (0.00) 80.9 (0.00) 37.4 (0.32) 18.1 (0.55) 5.7 (0.72) 0.2 (0.66) 
Chile-USA  167.3 (0.00) 121.4 (0.00) 83.2 (0.00) 52.2 (0.01) 26.7 (0.10) 10.0 (0.28) 1.3 (0.24) 
Czech R.-USA 168.3 (0.00) 95.8 (0.04) 62.1 (0.17) 37.6 (0.32) 15.5 (0.74) 4.0 (0.90) 0.2 (0.67) 
Denmark-USA 164.8 (0.00) 111.6 (0.00) 67.2 (0.07) 36.2 (0.38) 13.6 (0.85) 5.3 (0.77) 0.0 (0.81) 
Euro Area-USA 177.4 (0.00) 111.0 (0.00) 72.5 (0.02) 40.6 (0.19) 21.2 (0.34) 7.9 (0.47) 1.7 (0.19) 
Hungary-USA 150.0 (0.00) 101.9 (0.01) 67.5 (0.07) 40.2 (0.21) 17.7 (0.58) 6.6 (0.62) 0.6 (0.44) 
Iceland-USA 129.0 (0.03) 94.5 (0.06) 65.5 (0.10) 46.6 (0.06) 28.9 (0.06) 13.2 (0.10) 3.6 (0.05) 
Israel-USA 165.2 (0.00) 104.4 (0.01) 67.2 (0.07) 41.9 (0.16) 17.8 (0.58) 7.5 (0.51) 1.2 (0.27) 
Japan-USA 178.7 (0.00) 126.8 (0.00) 82.0 (0.00) 49.9 (0.03) 20.5 (0.38) 7.9 (0.47) 0.5 (0.45) 
S.Korea-USA 192.3 (0.00) 119.6 (0.00) 76.3 (0.01) 52.7 (0.01) 31.6 (0.03) 15.8 (0.04) 2.4 (0.11) 
Mexico-USA 145.8 (0.00) 100.3 (0.02) 64.5 (0.12) 37.3 (0.33) 15.2 (0.76) 6.8 (0.59) 0.1 (0.75) 
New Zealand-USA 156.1 (0.00) 87.3 (0.16) 57.3 (0.32) 33.4 (0.52) 15.7 (0.72) 8.8 (0.38) 3.1 (0.07) 
Norway-USA 195.6 (0.00) 132.0 (0.00) 86.8 (0.00) 44.1 (0.10) 22.8 (0.25) 8.7 (0.38) 0.2 (0.63) 
Poland-USA 166.8 (0.00) 106.2 (0.00) 73.9 (0.02) 46.5 (0.06) 24.0 (0.19) 10.0 (0.27) 0.0 (0.92) 
Sweden-USA 142.3 (0.00) 89.9 (0.11) 51.4 (0.57) 29.9 (0.72) 12.6 (0.90) 4.3 (0.87) 0.2 (0.64) 
Switzerland-USA 145.2 (0.00) 92.6 (0.08) 51.9 (0.55) 30.2 (0.70) 15.6 (0.74) 4.7 (0.83) 0.4 (0.53) 
Turkey-USA 220.7 (0.00) 153.1 (0.00) 92.4 (0.00) 46.5 (0.06) 24.3 (0.18) 9.8 (0.29) 0.0 (0.99) 
UK-USA 187.6 (0.00) 121.9 (0.00) 63.7 (0.13) 36.3 (0.37) 16.2 (0.69) 7.7 (0.49) 2.9 (0.08) 
Japan-Euro Area 165.1 (0.00) 113.6 (0.00) 68.1 (0.06) 36.4 (0.37) 14.8 (0.78) 2.8 (0.97) 0.0 (0.95) 
UK-Euro Area 179.3 (0.00) 111.9 (0.00) 73.6 (0.02) 38.1 (0.29) 16.2 (0.69) 7.8 (0.48) 1.5 (0.20) 
Hungary-Czech R. 170.3 (0.00) 87.6 (0.15) 56.4 (0.35) 31.0 (0.66) 16.6 (0.66) 3.9 (0.90) 0.03 (0.85) 
S.Korea-Czech R. 158.3 (0.00) 110.0 (0.00) 75.3 (0.01) 43.1 (0.12) 20.2 (0.40) 7.6 (0.50) 0.6 (0.41) 
Mexico- Czech R. 128.8 (0.03) 80.7 (0.33) 51.2 (0.58) 33.1 (0.54) 19.5 (0.45) 8.1 (0.45) 0.0 (0.87) 
Norway-Czech R. 149.0 (0.00) 93.5 (0.07) 59.4 (0.25) 30.8 (0.67) 17.0 (0.63) 5.8 (0.71) 0.1 (0.70) 
Poland-Czech R. 146.4 (0.00) 84.7 (0.22) 55.0 (0.41) 35.8 (0.40) 20.2 (0.40) 9.1 (0.35) 0.4 (0.49) 
Sweden-Czech R. 179.1 (0.00) 97.5 (0.03) 51.8 (0.55) 29.8 (0.72) 13.7 (0.85) 5.3 (0.77) 1.5 (0.21) 
Norway-Hungary 148.5 (0.00) 105.5 (0.00) 64.3 (0.12) 34.3 (0.48) 18.3 (0.53) 5.4 (0.75) 0.0 (0.86) 
Norway-Iceland 205.9 (0.00) 141.1 (0.00) 93.3 (0.00) 49.5 (0.03) 31.0 (0.03) 14.5 (0.06) 2.5 (0.10) 
Norway-Israel 152.7 (0.00) 103.3 (0.01) 63.3 (0.14) 38.8 (0.26) 20.0 (0.42) 9.6 (0.31) 0.6 (0.40) 
Norway-S.Korea 149.1 (0.00) 84.5 (0.23) 51.4 (0.57) 34.9 (0.44) 22.2 (0.28) 10.9 (0.21) 4.6 (0.03) 
Norway-Mexico 166.5 (0.00) 107.0 (0.00) 70.5 (0.04) 40.6 (0.20) 21.9 (0.29) 7.3 (0.53) 1.5 (0.21) 
Norway-Poland 155.7 (0.00) 91.2 (0.09) 57.0 (0.33) 32.6 (0.57) 13.9 (0.84) 5.8 (0.71) 1.6 (0.20) 
Norway-Turkey 144.9 (0.00) 99.1 (0.02) 67.5 (0.07) 40.3 (0.20) 18.5 (0.52) 3.0 (0.96) 0.0 (0.90) 
Sweden-Hungary 176.7 (0.00) 106.5 (0.00) 64.7 (0.11) 38.0 (0.29) 17.2 (0.61) 7.0 (0.57) 1.1 (0.28) 
Sweden-Iceland 113.6 (0.21) 76.9 (0.47) 51.4 (0.57) 30.1 (0.71) 15.9 (0.71) 7.1 (0.56) 0.5 (0.46) 
Sweden-S.Korea 148.8 (0.00) 88.2 (0.14) 54.8 (0.42) 31.3 (0.64) 18.0 (0.56) 6.1 (0.67) 0.9 (0.33) 
Sweden-Mexico 144.5 (0.00) 91.9 (0.08) 56.4 (0.35) 26.1 (0.88) 8.1 (0.99) 3.1 (0.96) 0.0 (0.92) 
Sweden-Poland 148.0 (0.00) 107.5 (0.00) 73.9 (0.02) 41.4 (0.17) 18.2 (0.55) 7.9 (0.46) 1.3 (0.25) 
Sweden-Turkey 143.3 (0.00) 102.6 (0.01) 66.8 (0.08) 33.5 (0.52) 19.3 (0.46) 8.6 (0.39) 0.4 (0.51) 
 
Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. p-values are given in parantheses. 
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Trace Test Results: Forward-Looking Monetary Model 
 
Home-Foreign r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 r ≤ 4 
Australia-USA 61.7 (0.18) 28.4 (0.79) 14.9 (0.78) 6.8 (0.59) 0.0 (0.98) 
Canada-USA  102.5 (0.00) 62.6 (0.00) 28.8 (0.06) 7.6 (0.50) 1.5 (0.21) 
Chile-USA  86.4 (0.00) 44.6 (0.09) 22.9 (0.24) 7.6 (0.50) 0.3 (0.55) 
Czech R.-USA 110.6 (0.00) 47.5 (0.05) 18.8 (0.50) 5.9 (0.69) 0.0 (0.85) 
Denmark-USA 87.7 (0.00) 44.2 (0.10) 14.0 (0.83) 5.5 (0.75) 0.0 (0.90) 
Euro Area-USA 96.5 (0.00) 58.2 (0.00) 33.7 (0.01) 14.4 (0.07) 0.7 (0.39) 
Hungary-USA 81.7 (0.00) 45.1 (0.08) 26.6 (0.11) 10.6 (0.23) 0.7 (0.38) 
Iceland-USA 86.0 (0.00) 54.8 (0.00) 27.1 (0.09) 10.6 (0.23) 2.7 (0.09) 
Israel-USA 84.6 (0.00) 49.1 (0.03) 26.0 (0.12) 11.1 (0.20) 0.4 (0.49) 
Japan-USA 96.9 (0.00) 54.9 (0.00) 21.8 (0.30) 10.4 (0.24) 0.8 (0.36) 
S.Korea-USA 119.0 (0.00) 76.7 (0.00) 35.9 (0.00) 10.4 (0.24) 0.6 (0.41) 
Mexico-USA 135.3 (0.00) 61.1 (0.00) 30.0 (0.04) 12.8 (0.12) 0.4 (0.52) 
New Zealand-USA 88.9 (0.00) 43.2 (0.12) 21.3 (0.33) 9.4 (0.32) 2.1 (0.14) 
Norway-USA 106.2 (0.00) 57.7 (0.00) 25.8 (0.13) 3.6 (0.92) 0.0 (0.89) 
Poland-USA 74.1 (0.02) 43.5 (0.11) 19.3 (0.46) 4.7 (0.83) 0.1 (0.72) 
Sweden-USA 76.8 (0.01) 33.5 (0.52) 14.0 (0.83) 5.0 (0.80) 0.1 (0.67) 
Switzerland-USA 84.3 (0.00) 46.6 (0.06) 17.5 (0.60) 7.2 (0.54) 0.3 (0.59) 
Turkey-USA 118.7 (0.00) 63.1 (0.00) 32.9 (0.02) 9.5 (0.31) 0.6 (0.44) 
UK-USA 73.2 (0.02) 37.2 (0.33) 16.2 (0.69) 7.0 (0.57) 2.1 (0.14) 
Japan-Euro Area 94.3 (0.00) 50.3 (0.02) 23.7 (0.21) 6.1 (0.67) 0.0 (0.85) 
UK-Euro Area 94.6 (0.00) 45.4 (0.08) 24.5 (0.17) 9.2 (0.34) 2.3 (0.12) 
Hungary-Czech R. 100.1 (0.00) 38.5 (0.27) 15.2 (0.76) 4.1 (0.89) 0.2 (0.67) 
S.Korea-Czech R. 90.9 (0.00) 54.0 (0.01) 24.1 (0.19) 9.1 (0.35) 0.3 (0.57) 
Mexico-Czech R. 75.5 (0.01) 43.0 (0.13) 16.9 (0.64) 5.8 (0.70) 0.0 (0.91) 
Norway-Czech R. 111.8 (0.00) 63.4 (0.00) 24.7 (0.16) 4.6 (0.84) 2.1 (0.14) 
Poland-Czech R. 76.5 (0.01) 30.9 (0.67) 12.6 (0.90) 6.0 (0.69) 0.7 (0.40) 
Sweden-Czech R. 127.5 (0.00) 56.6 (0.00) 20.4 (0.39) 5.5 (0.75) 1.8 (0.17) 
Norway-Hungary 78.8 (0.00) 38.7 (0.27) 17.7 (0.58) 5.0 (0.80) 0.3 (0.55) 
Norway-Iceland 89.0 (0.00) 45.0 (0.08) 24.6 (0.17) 8.4 (0.41) 0.1 (0.68) 
Norway-Israel 77.0 (0.01) 37.6 (0.31) 18.4 (0.53) 9.3 (0.33) 3.0 (0.28) 
Norway-S.Korea 97.9 (0.00) 45.0 (0.08) 23.3 (0.23) 11.6 (0.17) 3.3 (0.06) 
Norway-Mexico 85.7 (0.00) 52.1 (0.01) 23.2 (0.23) 5.3 (0.77) 1.2 (0.26) 
Norway-Poland 98.3 (0.00) 44.2 (0.10) 20.5 (0.38) 7.9 (0.46) 2.7 (0.09) 
Norway-Turkey 83.3 (0.00) 45.6 (0.07) 24.4 (0.18) 5.0 (0.79) 0.0 (0.90) 
Sweden-Hungary 95.5 (0.00) 41.8 (0.16) 18.8 (0.50) 9.3 (0.33) 2.0 (0.15) 
Sweden-Iceland 74.4 (0.02) 43.2 (0.12) 20.5 (0.38) 6.1 (0.68) 0.4 (0.48) 
Sweden-S.Korea 95.8 (0.00) 50.8 (0.02) 23.1 (0.24) 9.5 (0.31) 0.5 (0.45) 
Sweden-Mexico 47.3 (0.74) 23.6 (0.94) 11.4 (0.95) 4.7 (0.83) 0.2 (0.62) 
Sweden-Poland 81.1 (0.00) 51.3 (0.02) 23.8 (0.20) 9.6 (0.31) 3.7 (0.05) 
Sweden-Turkey 74.3 (0.02) 41.8 (0.16) 19.6 (0.45) 7.1 (0.56) 0.0 (0.87) 
 
  Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. p-values are given in parantheses. 
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Trace Test Results: Real Interest Differential Model 
 
 
Home-Foreign r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 r ≤ 4 r ≤ 5 r ≤ 6 r ≤ 7 r ≤ 8 
Australia-USA 272 (0.00) 184 (0.00) 136 (0.00) 96.8 (0.04) 58.2 (0.29) 33.1 (0.55) 15.6 (0.73) 6.4 (0.63) 0.3 (0.56) 
Canada-USA  368 (0.00) 257 (0.00) 181 (0.00) 115 (0.00) 70.0 (0.04) 38.0 (0.30) 16.8 (0.65) 6.1 (0.67) 0.3 (0.56) 
Chile-USA  292 (0.00) 174 (0.00) 129 (0.03) 87.4 (0.16) 55.4 (0.39) 31.8 (0.62) 11.5 (0.94) 4.1 (0.88) 0.1 (0.69) 
Czech R.-USA 278 (0.00) 189 (0.00) 128 (0.03) 83.6 (0.25) 53.4 (0.48) 29.8 (0.72) 16.3 (0.68) 4.9 (0.81) 0.4 (0.53) 
Denmark-USA 309 (0.00) 223 (0.00) 149 (0.00) 92.5 (0.08) 45.6 (0.80) 26.4 (0.87) 10.7 (0.96) 3.1 (0.95) 0.6 (0.44) 
Euro Area-USA 291 (0.00) 207 (0.00) 136 (0.00) 92.2 (0.08) 52.8 (0.51) 32.4 (0.58) 17.8 (0.57) 4.5 (0.85) 0.0 (0.81) 
Hungary-USA 443 (0.00) 315 (0.00) 218 (0.00) 154 (0.00) 100 (0.00) 53.9 (0.01) 25.9 (0.13) 9.8 (0.29) 1.5 (0.21) 
Iceland-USA 252 (0.00) 180 (0.00) 130 (0.02) 91.7 (0.09) 55.8 (0.38) 34.4 (0.47) 20.9 (0.36) 8.1 (0.45) 2.5 (0.11) 
Israel-USA 249 (0.00) 184 (0.00) 136 (0.00) 92.2 (0.08) 65.1 (0.11) 40.4 (0.20) 22.6 (0.26) 7.3 (0.53) 0.1 (0.74) 
Japan-USA 389 (0.00) 277 (0.00) 187 (0.00) 120 (0.00) 76.1 (0.01) 43.3 (0.12) 23.7 (0.21) 10.0 (0.27) 1.8 (0.17) 
S.Korea-USA 291 (0.00) 207 (0.00) 145 (0.00) 99.3 (0.02) 60.0 (0.23) 37.4 (0.32) 22.9 (0.24) 9.6 (0.30) 3.4 (0.06) 
Mexico-USA 266 (0.00) 201 (0.00) 143 (0.00) 98.5 (0.03) 61.1 (0.20) 30.9 (0.66) 12.4 (0.91) 3.3 (0.94) 0.0 (0.88) 
New Zealand-USA 248 (0.00) 169 (0.01) 126 (0.04) 89.2 (0.12) 58.6 (0.27) 33.3 (0.53) 16.8 (0.65) 9.0 (0.36) 3.7 (0.05) 
Norway-USA 297 (0.00) 225 (0.00) 170 (0.00) 116 (0.00) 72.3 (0.03) 38.2 (0.29) 22.2 (0.28) 9.2 (0.34) 0.1 (0.74) 
Poland-USA 294 (0.00) 218 (0.00) 166 (0.00) 116 (0.00) 77.9 (0.00) 47.3 (0.05) 21.9 (0.30) 5.2 (0.78) 0.2 (0.61) 
Sweden-USA 255 (0.00) 190 (0.00) 132 (0.01) 85.9 (0.19) 48.7 (0.69) 29.3 (0.75) 17.9 (0.56) 8.6 (0.39) 0.0 (0.84) 
Switzerland-USA 256 (0.00) 186 (0.00) 138 (0.00) 97.2 (0.03) 61.6 (0.18) 36.6 (0.36) 16.6 (0.66) 5.5 (0.74) 0.0 (0.87) 
Turkey-USA 350 (0.00) 272 (0.00) 199 (0.00) 135 (0.00) 83.5 (0.00) 46.4 (0.06) 26.7 (0.10) 12.5 (0.13) 0.2 (0.60) 
UK-USA 321 (0.00) 219 (0.00) 144 (0.00) 92.9 (0.07) 49.0 (0.67) 22.9 (0.96) 9.6 (0.98) 4.3 (0.87) 1.2 (0.27) 
Japan-Euro Area 399 (0.00) 252 (0.00) 163 (0.00) 111 (0.00) 73.1 (0.02) 45.3 (0.08) 24.3 (0.18) 9.5 (0.31) 0.3 (0.55) 
UK-Euro Area 263 (0.00) 180 (0.00) 132 (0.01) 97.1 (0.04) 66.2 (0.09) 45.2 (0.08) 26.4 (0.11) 15.0 (0.05) 5.8 (0.01) 
Hungary-Czech R. 827 (0.00) 633 (0.00) 485 (0.00) 357 (0.00) 252 (0.00) 153 (0.00) 87.7 (0.00) 29.3 (0.00) 3.2 (0.07) 
S.Korea-Czech R. 288 (0.00) 226 (0.00) 167 (0.00) 114 (0.00) 74.5 (0.02) 43.9 (0.11) 26.4 (0.11) 10.8 (0.21) 0.6 (0.41) 
Mexico-Czech R. 297 (0.00) 208 (0.00) 137 (0.00) 91.3 (0.09) 56.8 (0.34) 28.4 (0.79) 16.5 (0.67) 4.9 (0.81) 0.2 (0.61) 
Norway-Czech R. 281 (0.00) 211 (0.00) 142 (0.00) 92.4 (0.08) 50.4 (0.61) 26.7 (0.86) 14.7 (0.79) 6.6 (0.62) 0.5 (0.44) 
Poland-Czech R. 293 (0.00) 214 (0.00) 148 (0.00) 101 (0.01) 68.3 (0.06) 38.8 (0.26) 20.1 (0.41) 9.8 (0.28) 2.0 (0.15) 
Sweden-Czech R. 249 (0.00) 172 (0.00) 122 (0.07) 85.6 (0.20) 51.8 (0.55) 32.0 (0.60) 15.2 (0.76) 5.8 (0.71) 1.6 (0.20) 
Norway-Hungary 328 (0.00) 230 (0.00) 159 (0.00) 117 (0.00) 79.9 (0.00) 51.7 (0.02) 25.5 (0.14) 10.0 (0.28) 0.8 (0.35) 
Norway-Iceland 254 (0.00) 180 (0.00) 128 (0.03) 82.6 (0.28) 54.9 (0.42) 32.0 (0.61) 18.2 (0.54) 8.8 (0.38) 0.9 (0.32) 
Norway-Israel 249 (0.00) 184 (0.00) 127 (0.03) 88.8 (0.13) 57.5 (0.32) 34.5 (0.47) 20.8 (0.36) 8.9 (0.37) 0.1 (0.76) 
Norway-S.Korea 273 (0.00) 195 (0.00) 139 (0.00) 87.5 (0.16) 60.5 (0.22) 36.6 (0.36) 21.5 (0.32) 10.2 (0.26) 2.4 (0.11) 
Norway-Mexico 302 (0.00) 225 (0.00) 167 (0.00) 116 (0.00) 76.2 (0.01) 49.6 (0.03) 27.0 (0.10) 11.8 (0.16) 1.2 (0.26) 
Norway-Poland 295 (0.00) 219 (0.00) 151 (0.00) 98.5 (0.03) 63.7 (0.13) 34.7 (0.45) 18.8 (0.50) 8.4 (0.42) 3.2 (0.07) 
Norway-Turkey 260 (0.00) 196 (0.00) 140 (0.00) 94.1 (0.06) 64.9 (0.11) 40.8 (0.19) 22.4 (0.27) 5.9 (0.70) 0.7 (0.40) 
Sweden-Hungary 294 (0.00) 213 (0.00) 153 (0.00) 100 (0.02) 69.3 (0.05) 40.9 (0.18) 21.1 (0.35) 7.9 (0.47) 1.0 (0.31) 
Sweden-Iceland 229 (0.00) 158 (0.05) 113 (0.22) 77.8 (0.43) 51.4 (0.57) 32.2 (0.59) 20.7 (0.37) 9.9 (0.28) 0.8 (0.36) 
Sweden-S.Korea 268 (0.00) 196 (0.00) 134 (0.01) 83.3 (0.26) 52.2 (0.53) 28.4 (0.79) 15.7 (0.72) 6.1 (0.67) 0.7 (0.39) 
Sweden-Mexico 251 (0.00) 190 (0.00) 136 (0.00) 96.0 (0.04) 63.0 (0.15) 33.7 (0.51) 17.7 (0.58) 3.6 (0.93) 0.0 (0.94) 
Sweden-Poland 269 (0.00) 193 (0.00) 133 (0.01) 96.4 (0.04) 64.7 (0.11) 39.3 (0.24) 20.4 (0.39) 8.2 (0.44) 0.6 (0.42) 
Sweden-Turkey 245 (0.00) 176 (0.00) 128 (0.03) 90.8 (0.10) 55.5 (0.39) 34.3 (0.48) 14.4 (0.81) 4.1 (0.89) 0.0 (0.78) 
 
Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. p-values are given in parantheses. 
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Trace Test Results: Purchasing Power Parity 
 
 
Trace Test Results:  Keynesian Money Demand Function 
Home-Foreign r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2  Country r = 0 r ≤ 1 r ≤ 2 r ≤ 3 
Australia-USA 36.8 (0.00) 14.4 (0.07) 2.6 (0.10)  Australia 103 (0.00) 31.6 (0.03) 11.7 (0.17) 3.9 (0.04) 
Canada-USA  53.4 (0.00) 3.8 (0.91) 0.3 (0.57)  Canada 148 (0.00) 42.2 (0.00) 16.7 (0.03) 0.1 (0.68) 
Chile-USA  24.0 (0.19) 8.9 (0.36) 1.6 (0.20)  Chile 51.8 (0.02) 19.9 (0.42) 5.7 (0.72) 0.0 (0.89) 
Czech R.-USA 19.7 (0.44) 4.8 (0.82) 0.7 (0.39)  Czech R. 62.2 (0.00) 32.7 (0.02) 12.3 (0.14) 0.8 (0.35) 
Denmark-USA 20.3 (0.40) 6.8 (0.60) 1.5 (0.21)  Denmark 38.3 (0.28) 14.9 (0.78) 7.0 (0.56) 2.7 (0.09) 
Euro Area-USA 26.3 (0.11) 10.2 (0.26) 2.5 (0.10)  Euro Area 80.8 (0.00) 30.9 (0.03) 15.0 (0.05) 3.5 (0.06) 
Hungary-USA 33.1 (0.02) 9.2 (0.34) 2.9 (0.08)  Hungary 52.7 (0.01) 22.3 (0.28) 5.5 (0.74) 1.7 (0.18) 
Iceland-USA 36.2 (0.00) 11.4 (0.18) 0.6 (0.42)  Iceland 68.4 (0.00) 36.7 (0.00) 14.4 (0.07) 3.7 (0.05) 
Israel-USA 15.5 (0.74) 3.3 (0.94) 0.5 (0.45)  Israel 38.4 (0.28) 19.6 (0.44) 10.5 (0.24) 1.5 (0.21) 
Japan-USA 156 (0.00) 28.0 (0.00) 8.3 (0.00)  Japan 86.6 (0.00) 35.3 (0.01) 14.5 (0.06) 0.0 (0.84) 
S. Korea-USA 43.6 (0.00) 20.5 (0.00) 0.4 (0.49)  S. Korea 51.9 (0.01) 31.0 (0.03) 12.4 (0.13) 1.9 (0.16) 
Mexico-USA 74.8 (0.00) 22.6 (0.00) 0.9 (0.31)  Mexico 55.3 (0.00) 24.5 (0.17) 6.2 (0.67) 1.6 (0.19) 
New Zealand-USA 24.8 (0.16) 8.8 (0.38) 0.4 (0.53)  New Zealand 57.3 (0.00) 19.5 (0.45) 8.1 (0.45) 1.3 (0.25) 
Norway-USA 30.2 (0.04) 7.3 (0.53) 0.6 (0.43)  Norway 64.8 (0.00) 27.9 (0.08) 5.5 (0.75) 1.7 (0.18) 
Poland-USA 27.8 (0.08) 6.1 (0.67) 2.4 (0.12)  Poland 51.8 (0.02) 23.5 (0.21) 9.8 (0.29) 2.9 (0.08) 
Sweden-USA 23.0 (0.24) 7.6 (0.50) 0.3 (0.54)  Sweden 59.3 (0.00) 25.1 (0.15) 7.5 (0.51) 0.1 (0.68) 
Switzerland-USA 23.6 (0.21) 10.5 (0.24) 0.1 (0.73)  Switzerland 62.0 (0.00) 19.4 (0.45) 7.0 (0.57) 0.2 (0.61) 
Turkey-USA 21.4 (0.32) 8.6 (0.39) 0.2 (0.61)  Turkey 57.3 (0.00) 22.7 (0.26) 9.0 (0.36) 0.2 (0.64) 
UK-USA 18.6 (0.52) 6.0 (0.68) 0.0 (0.94)  UK 54.6 (0.01) 26.6 (0.11) 10.6 (0.23) 0.0 (0.91) 
Japan-Euro Area 35.2 (0.01) 13.9 (0.08) 3.4 (0.06)  USA 82.1 (0.00) 35.6 (0.00) 4.4 (0.86) 0.6 (0.43) 
UK-Euro Area 42.0 (0.00) 6.3 (0.65) 0.3 (0.56)       
Hungary-Czech R. 37.4 (0.00) 9.9 (0.28) 2.4 (0.11)       
S.Korea-Czech R. 28.2 (0.07) 9.3 (0.33) 2.6 (0.10)       
Mexico- Czech R. 27.2 (0.09) 10.2 (0.26) 1.6 (0.19)       
Norway-Czech R. 35.2 (0.01) 13.4 (0.10) 1.7 (0.19)       
Poland-Czech R. 37.9 (0.00) 12.6 (0.12) 2.0 (0.15)       
Sweden-Czech R. 18.4 (0.53) 5.3 (0.76) 0.9 (0.32)       
Norway-Hungary 31.7 (0.02) 8.8 (0.38) 1.9 (0.15)       
Norway- Iceland 33.5 (0.01) 16.6 (0.03) 5.7 (0.01)       
Norway-Israel 31.3 (0.03) 4.2 (0.87) 0.2 (0.60)       
Norway- S.Korea 14.0 (0.83) 6.8 (0.59) 1.6 (0.20)       
Norway-Mexico 41.7 (0.00) 18.6 (0.01) 1.0 (0.30)       
Norway-Poland 21.0 (0.35) 7.1 (0.55) 1.7 (0.19)       
Norway-Turkey 27.6 (0.08) 7.4 (0.52) 0.5 (0.45)       
Sweden-Hungary 34.0 (0.01) 8.6 (0.39) 3.0 (0.08)       
Sweden-Iceland 19.7 (0.43) 9.4 (0.32) 0.8 (0.35)       
Sweden- S.Korea 36.2 (0.00) 9.4 (0.32) 2.5 (0.11)       
Sweden-Mexico 57.2 (0.00) 14.8 (0.06) 5.1 (0.02)       
Sweden-Poland 31.8 (0.02) 13.2 (0.10) 2.5 (0.11)       
Sweden-Turkey 15.7 (0.73) 4.6 (0.84) 0.0 (0.90)       
 
 Note: r denotes the number of cointegrating vectors. p-values are given in parantheses. 
  
